

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.23

18 April 1962

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

FEB 15 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 18 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. A. VALLADAO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV  
Mr. N. MINCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K.K. RAO  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. D. GONZALEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. H. BLIX  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. R.I. SPIERS  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (interpretation from French): I declare open the twenty-third meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): On 25 September 1961 the President of the United States submitted to the United Nations the United States "Programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" in order to end the age-old fear of mankind: the dread scourge of war. This programme provided for the elimination of all national armed forces and all national armaments. It provided for verification of disarmament obligations and for the strengthening of dispute-settling and peace-keeping institutions. It called for the accomplishment of these ends in three balanced stages.

You are all familiar with our 25 September programme. You have our pamphlet setting it forth. It has also been circulated as Conference document ENDC/6.

The Secretary of State of the United States, when he met here with your Foreign Ministers last month, presented certain details. He emphasized that the United States plan for general and complete disarmament did indeed provide for general and complete disarmament.

He presented additional details particularly in elaboration of stage I of the United States programme ENDC/PV.2, page 217. The Secretary of State proposed that in the first stage all nuclear delivery vehicles and all major conventional armaments be reduced by thirty per cent. He explained that provision must be made not only to achieve and maintain reduced numbers of weapons but also, in the case of strategic delivery vehicles, to achieve and maintain reduced destructive capability as well.

He proposed that, after cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union should each transfer 50,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes, in order to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons material.

The Secretary of State proposed that a system of progressive zonal inspection might solve the verification problem in a way which ensured that the amount of inspection was proportional to the amount of disarmament.

He further proposed that steps be taken immediately to reduce the risks of war. He referred to measures designed to minimize the chances of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communication or surprise attack, measures that we have offered to discuss in the Committee of the Whole.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Since the visit of the Secretary of State to Geneva, the United States has developed additional specific proposals in our plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. These additional specific proposals are embodied in a draft treaty outline which I now table on behalf of the United States Government at this Conference. I ask that it be circulated as a Conference document. Copies of the document<sup>(1)</sup> are now being distributed to you.

The treaty outline is a detailed working paper containing the substance of the basic provisions which would ultimately be included in a formal treaty on general and complete disarmament as our work here at the Conference progresses. The United States wants this document, together with documents presented by other members of our Conference, to be considered by the Conference in its efforts to produce agreement on general and complete disarmament.

As you see, the United States document is entitled "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world". We have not included in the document the preamble, the working draft (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1) of which was approved ad referendum at our meeting yesterday. The document does contain the sections which set forth the disarmament, verification and peace-keeping measures to be carried out in each of the three stages.

Let me explain at the beginning that with respect to disarmament the scheme of the United States plan is a simple one. Fundamentally it is that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero, always keeping the relative military positions of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning.

Of course, the simple scheme of shrinking, or miniaturization, must allow for some variations. This is because it is probable that not all nations will be in the plan at the beginning; it is because production of all armaments cannot and should not be shut down overnight; it is because not all other things in the world will be shrinking along with armaments. The skies, the oceans and outer space, for example, will not be shrinking, nor will the degree of commitment of a nation to its ideals. Those cannot be made to shrink with the armaments, and it is fortunate that this is so.

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(1) ENDC/30 and Corr.1

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Nevertheless, as I have said, the scheme of the United States plan is simple. It is a plan -- with minor variations during the first few years caused by the tapering-off of production -- under which all military forces and establishments of all parties shrink together and in proportion.

This is as it should be. Each nation understands its present forces; each nation understands its neighbours' present forces. The United States plan for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world maintains that position. Think of a balloon: instead of permitting more and more air to be blown into the balloon until it bursts, the air is let out of the balloon, and the balloon shrinks in simple proportion until the air is all gone. This is the essence of the United States plan.

I now come to some details of the treaty outline. Of course, I shall not mention all its provisions; there are too many for that. But let me mention some highlights.

Stage I starts on page 3, stage II on page 20, and stage III on page 28 of the text that is now being circulated to representatives.

In stage I the United States proposes a broad series of measures with respect to the reduction of armaments and armed forces; the establishment of an international disarmament organization to ensure the enforcement in an agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace.

The United States proposes during stage I a 30 per cent cut in all armaments the reduction of which it seems practicable to supervise. That is, stage I provides for a 30 per cent cut in all nuclear delivery vehicles and all major conventional armaments. This cut should be made in three yearly steps of 10 per cent each. The cut would be applied to the armaments of the United States, those of the Soviet Union and those of other parties to the treaty as might be agreed. It would be applied, with minor variations with which I will deal later, to all types of nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments.

Let me show you the armaments we are talking about and the way this cut would work. There is an illustrative list of categories on pages 3 and 4 of the treaty outline. This list is intended to include all nuclear delivery vehicles and all major conventional armaments; it is intended to include all armaments the reduction of which we could reasonably expect to supervise in stage I.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The list includes all missiles and rockets with range in excess of ten kilometres together with their related fixed launching pads; all armed aircraft weighing over 2,500 kilogrammes; all tanks; all armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers; all aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines; and so on.

Look with me, if you will, at the first category, on page 3. By "category", I mean, of course, a fairly broad class of armaments, and by "type", a further sub-division within a category. This first category includes the most powerful armaments.

It includes all armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes, missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their fixed launching pads, and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater. We propose not only that the total armaments in this category but also, with the small exception I have referred to before, that each type of armament in this category be cut 30 per cent.

A "type" is a very narrow class of armament. The United States would therefore have to apply this cut to its B-52 aircraft, to its Titan missiles, to its Atlas missiles, to its submarine-launched Polaris missiles, to its Hound Dog missiles and to any other type of delivery vehicle which, by the time the treaty was negotiated, came into the category description. The United States inventory of each of these types of vehicles would have to be reduced by 30 per cent.

In this same category of nuclear delivery vehicles, the Soviet Union, for example, would have to apply the 30 per cent cut to its heavy four-turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev and known in the West as the "Bear"; to its heavy four-jet bomber designed by Miasishchev and called in the West the "Bison"; to its inter-continental missiles of the types fired to the Kamchatka peninsula and into the Pacific; to its missiles on submarines; to its air-to-surface missiles displayed last year with the "Bear" bomber; and so on.

In the case of the United States Titan and Atlas missiles, as in the case of the Soviet missiles in this category, related fixed launching pads would be cut along with the missiles. The same would be true with respect to fixed launching pads related to missiles which would be cut in other categories.

Another category can be used to illustrate the manner of reduction. For example, category 7 includes all tanks. In the case of the United States, the cut in armaments would be a cut in each and every type of United States tank -- such as the M-47 medium tank, the M-48 medium tank, and the M-60 main battle tank.



(Mr. Dean, United States)

In the case of the Soviet Union, the destruction would have to apply to its JS-III heavy tanks, the T-10 heavy tanks, the T-54 medium tanks, the T-34/85 medium tanks, the PT-76 amphibious light tanks, and so on -- a 30 per cent reduction in the inventories in each and every type.

The same principle would apply across the board in stage I, and, as you will see later, it would apply through stages II and III.

The method of reduction is described in paragraph 2, which begins on page 4 of the treaty outline. This method of reduction proposes that, during the first part of each of the three one-year steps, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during the whole of stage I would be placed in depots under the supervision of the international disarmament organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where it made sense and could be adequately supervised, converted to peaceful uses.

Verification that armaments were destroyed and assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels would be provided by the international disarmament organization in accordance with arrangements to be worked out and set forth in an annex to the treaty.

I will describe later in more detail the type of method the United States has in mind for verifying the fact that retained armaments do not exceed agreed levels. It is enough to say at this point that it will be worked out in such a manner as to provide that the extent of the inspection is related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations.

In dealing with armaments, we have of course to deal with the problem of production. The United States treaty outline provides that, by the beginning of stage II, production shall be halted, except for the production of spare parts. It is simply not practical to impose such a restriction on the production of armaments while we are just starting down the path to disarmament in stage I. Why? First, all nations will not be in the plan at the start, and second, we will not have developed the necessary confidence in the process to make this possible. This confidence will come and increase as our work on general and complete disarmament goes on.

It will be possible, however, to impose restrictions on production during stage I, and the United States treaty outline provides that, during stage I, production should be limited to agreed allowances which permit only limited

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production in each of the categories to which I have referred. It is in this connexion that, during stage I only, the reductions of armaments, as I mentioned earlier, cannot be precisely by type across the board. It might not be possible to slice up a battleship in three parts. But by the end of stage I, production of all new armaments will have been halted.

There should be no misunderstanding about one thing, however. The production which is permitted in no way limits the obligation, which is absolute, to reduce armaments by a net of 30 per cent over the three years in stage I. Any armament produced in a category must be compensated for, under the United States treaty outline, by the destruction of sufficient additional armaments in that category to ensure that the 30 per cent reduction in the category is maintained. The exact way in which these adjustments are handled is set out on pages 5 and 6 of the treaty outline.

As for force levels, you are familiar with the United States proposal for reduction by the United States and the Soviet Union. In stage I the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce their armed forces to 2.1 million each. The treaty outline, at page 6, provides further that the forces of other "specified parties" would be fixed at agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. It provides also that all other parties to the treaty would, with certain agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever was higher, provided that in no case would existing force levels be exceeded.

The United States treaty outline also attacks directly the nuclear threat. During stage I, fissionable material production for use in weapons would be halted and the United States and the Soviet Union would begin to transfer agreed quantities of weapons-grade U-235 from past production to purposes other than weapons. You will note that I used the term "agreed quantities". As I recalled earlier this morning, the Secretary of State in his speeches here last month proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should each transfer 50,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 to non-weapons purposes.

The United States stands behind this offer of 50,000 kilogrammes each. It is a very meaningful offer. We are prepared to implement it, and we are prepared to listen to views on it. In substance, what the United States is now saying to the Soviet Union is this: "If our earlier offer of 50,000 kilogrammes of

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Weapons-grade U.235 is not acceptable to you, then what is acceptable? Make an offer of your own. We can discuss it and see if we cannot agree on the quantities of this death-dealing material which each of us should remove from weapons or weapon pipelines. But let us get on with this discussion."

As you can see, stage I includes other measures:

The nuclear Powers would agree not to transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State and not to assist a non-nuclear State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

The parties would agree, if such an agreement had not already been reached, to prohibit, under effective international control, the testing of nuclear weapons.

The parties would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction. Such measures would include advance notification of launchings, pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles, and limitations on the production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles. Agreement on this measure could represent a real step forward towards international co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space.

The parties would implement a group of measures by which the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack might be reduced. Measures to reduce the risk of war would include advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, the establishment of observation posts at agreed locations to report on concentrations and movements of military forces, the creation of additional observation arrangements, an exchange of military missions, rapid communications between heads of government, and the creation of an international commission to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures.

Measures designed to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace are an important part of stage I. The parties would agree to refrain from the threat or use of any type of force contrary to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter. They would agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion, and would undertake to examine methods of assuring all States against such indirect aggression or subversion. Studies regarding the establishment of further rules of international conduct and the strengthening of procedures to maintain peace and settle disputes would be undertaken. The parties would agree

(Mr. Dean, United States)

to support measures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain peace and security. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty could be referred to the International Court of Justice. A United Nations peace observation corps would be established. Finally, the parties to the treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during stage I for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage II, including the conclusion of a detailed agreement relating to such a force.

Stage II carries on boldly from stage I. It would become feasible to include more armaments and to cut off entirely the production of new armaments; remaining inventories of armaments would be reduced; dispute-settling and peace-keeping machinery would be developed further.

Stage II, as I said earlier, would, like stage I, be of three years' duration, according to our present best estimate. In stage II, those parties which had been in since the beginning would slash their remaining armaments in half. New parties to the treaty would reduce their armaments by 65 per cent, to match the reductions made in stages I and II by the original parties to the treaty.

Remaining armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would likewise be cut by half. This means that the United States is proposing force levels of 1,050,000 each for itself and for the Soviet Union at the end of stage II. The forces of other States would be reduced by agreed percentages.

The parties to the treaty would in stage II, on the basis of agreed percentages, reduce nuclear weapons and stockpiles of fissionable materials for use in weapons to minimum levels, determined in the light of their stage I examination of the means of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapon stockpiles.

The parties to the treaty would also dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence.

During stage II the strengthening of the dispute-settling and peace-keeping arrangements begun in stage I would continue. This process would include acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide international legal disputes, the development of rules of international conduct and methods of settling disputes, and the establishment and progressive strengthening of the United Nations peace force.

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During stage III the parties would continue the disarmament process which had been started in stages I and II until they achieved the goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. An additional measure which would have to be included in stage III would be the reporting to the international disarmament organization of all scientific and technological discoveries of possible military significance. The international disarmament organization would be charged with establishing agreed arrangements to ensure that these discoveries were not used for military purposes -- to ensure that some new scientific breakthrough did not reverse the process of general and complete disarmament which had been so carefully achieved.

The duration of stage III, as I said at the beginning, is not specified. Rather it is proposed that stage III "would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible".

At the end of stage III, States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens. States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force which would be progressively strengthened during Stage III until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no State -- I repeat, no State -- could challenge it.

Except in connexion with the reporting of scientific discoveries in stage III, I have so far not mentioned the international disarmament organization. The organization, referred to as the IDO, will of course play an important role in the plan from the very beginning.

The United States proposes the establishment of an international disarmament organization which would have the function of verifying that countries lived up to the obligation, or the several obligations, which they undertook in a disarmament agreement. In describing the functions of this organization, the United States has given a great deal of thought to the proper application of two principles which were set forth in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations which representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union signed on 20 September 1961.

The first of these principles is:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations." (ENDC/5, page 2)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I think we can cut through all the unprofitable, unrealistic and tiresome exercises in semantics as to whether a particular measure of control is control over "disarmament" or control over "armaments" by pointing out that under this principle it is the nature of the obligation that determines the type of control which is necessary.

Paragraph 3 on page 13 of the draft treaty outline sets forth the way in which the United States has tried to put this principle into practice. Sub-paragraph (a) of the paragraph points out that, where the obligation relates solely to the reduction of armaments, the verification measures need relate only to the reduction process.

A good illustration of this point is our proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union each transfer specified quantities of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapon purposes. All that is necessary to verify such a measure is that the IDO be able to assure that the agreed quantities of U-235 -- 50,000 kilogrammes, or whatever we agree upon -- were indeed transferred to purposes other than for use in weapons and that the IDO be able to inspect and verify that the agreed quantities continue to be used for these non-weapon purposes. In verifying a measure of this kind, the IDO would not look at the remaining stockpiles, because in this particular instance that has no bearing on the measure -- it does not relate to the specific obligation which the parties have undertaken.

Sub-paragraph b of the same paragraph deals with the situation which exists when the measure is one in which the parties agree to halt or limit production. An illustration of this sort of measure is the United States proposal to cut off production of weapon-grade fissionable material.

Here again the IDO is required to have access to the relevant production facilities and activities, wherever located, on the territory of the party to the treaty. In verifying such a measure, we believe it would be reasonable to start with facilities declared by the party, and the interest of the IDO in inspection areas where no facilities have been declared is solely one of determining whether clandestine facilities exist.

Sub-paragraph c on page 13 deals with the verification procedures which are necessary when the obligation is one not to exceed agreed levels of armaments or armed forces or not to engage in clandestine production activities. An illustration of this type of measure would be the 2.1 million-man force levels proposed, the maintenance of inventories of armaments only at reduced levels, and the limitation

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on production of armaments. In this sub-paragraph the United States has made an effort to live up to the sound principle agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 September 1961, in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, that the nature and extent of such control depends on:

"the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage." (ENDC/5, page 2)

The United States has restated the principle in stage I of the treaty outline in the following way:

"The extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations." (page 13)

In its treaty outline the United States proposes, as an example of the means by which this principle might be given effect, the concept of progressive zonal inspections. I think I should emphasize that this concept is proposed merely as an example. All of us will want to give it further study, but it is the sort of measure towards which we must work if we are to break the impasse which we have so far faced on matters of inspection and verification.

Under this concept of progressive zonal inspections, the territory of each party would be divided into an agreed number of appropriate zones; each party would declare the total level, but initially not the precise location, of the armaments, forces and other activities subject to verification within each zone.

These zones would be progressively inspected, starting at the beginning of stage I. With the first 10 per cent reduction in armaments would come the inspection of the first zones; with the next 10 per cent reduction in armaments, more zones would be open to inspection; and so on until, at the end, when disarmament was general and complete, there would be inspection of the entire territory.

The procedure for selecting the zones to be inspected would be such that the State being inspected would have no advance notice of which zone would be chosen. Moreover, there would be necessary arrangements to prevent clandestine movements of armaments into and out of the zone being inspected.

Under a system of progressive zonal inspection, production facilities which were declared would be subject to inspection wherever located. The progressive zonal inspection would be the only means available to the IDO to check on clandestine production.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As I indicated earlier, the United States is putting forward this concept or theory of progressive zonal inspection merely as an interesting example of how we might achieve the objective of relating the extent of inspection during any step or stage to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risks to the parties to the treaty of possible violations.

I urge that we all study this method, and indeed all other methods, of achieving this objective. We have a completely open mind on this subject. If we make this study, I am confident that we can work out a successful system of verification which will provide firm assurance that the parties to the treaty are indeed honouring their obligations. This system, nevertheless, makes the extent of disarmament and the extent of inspection proceed together, side by side, until all arms of whatever kind or description are destroyed.

In conclusion, I want to repeat the key characteristics of this United States treaty outline which we have submitted to the Conference today.

It truly beats the swords into ploughshares and realizes the oldest dream of man -- the end of warfare. It carries us all the way to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

It provides for the simultaneous development of peace-keeping machinery.

It provides for verification which is in proportion to disarmament.

It calls, as near as may be, for a halt in the arms race -- a freezing of the great national military capabilities in the world and an across-the-board shrinking of those capabilities until they no longer exist.

Let us work together on this proposal with goodwill and imagination. Let us put into fruitful ideas of construction the same amount of creative power we now put into weapons of destruction. In this way we shall free men for their true destiny, and we shall move forward together in conquering disease and poverty and improving the material, the cultural and the spiritual welfare of mankind. It is to this task that we pledge our solemn obligations.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We have just listened to the succinct statement of the United States representative on the Outline of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which the United States has placed before our Committee.



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

I should like to express our satisfaction that the United States has found it possible and desirable, after our discussions have begun, to submit a draft on the most important problem of our time - general and complete disarmament. It is a draft treaty which, together with the treaty submitted at the beginning of our Committee's work, will give us an overall view of the general ideas of the two parties on the problem of general and complete disarmament. This draft treaty will also give us a clearer understanding of some of the ideas which the United States has put forward during our past discussions on general and complete disarmament, and of those it has been expounding more recently.

It is certainly a fairly long document, which deserves to be studied with the closest attention, and that we shall do. We shall then state our views on the whole series of measures proposed in this treaty. I should like to point out at once, however, after a first very superficial look at the draft treaty following the statement made by the representative of the United States, that it more or less faithfully reproduces all the measures so far put forward by the United States delegation on various occasions, both here and in United Nations debates.

I also wish to point out, after this first glance, that the draft treaty reflects certain very controversial former positions that have not in any way facilitated our progress towards general and complete disarmament, which our Committee and the United Nations have taken as their main objective. We had thought that, as this draft treaty was submitted in the middle of our discussions, it would have taken account of their beginning, of our difficulties in organizing certain things, and of the ideas that have been expressed here during our discussions, and would thus have been able to facilitate our work even more than it does, so that we could achieve really positive results.

At the first sight we have not in fact found anywhere in this draft treaty the reflection of certain ideas that would be calculated to facilitate our task much more than the mere presentation of a few old concepts which have been expounded in the past. In particular, this draft treaty and the way the measures are presented do not facilitate my task today either, when I have to speak on control over disarmament measures. For the draft presents the disarmament measures in such a way that control is difficult to organize.

I would now like to consider this question, which was covered by the first part ENDC/18 submitted to us by the United States a few days ago, shortly before this complete draft.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The discussion and examination of the general obligations relating to disarmament measures have been concluded, and we are now going to draw up a joint text. We have already had an opportunity of doing this for article 1 of our treaty. It seems to us now that it is necessary to continue, while giving the most careful attention, of course, to the draft just submitted and to the other specific points which this draft will enable us to develop in rather more detail. We must go on to the subsequent questions. Now the next question- after the first, which was article 1 on the obligations to be included in a treaty on general and complete disarmament - is that of the possibility of defining, in a general way, all the obligations which States should assume in connexion with disarmament and, of course, the question of the control which should be exercised over the disarmament measures, the extent of the control and, if possible, certain procedures for its application.

The absolute necessity of effective control while disarmament measures are being carried out, if general and complete disarmament is to be achieved, has been brought out clearly and definitely enough in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961. In that Statement the principle of control is defined as follows:

"6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised. the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage." (ENDC/5, page 2)

This text enlightens us on the purpose and nature of control relating to disarmament, and on the place control should occupy in the system of general and complete disarmament. Thus the function assigned to control is to provide the firm assurance that all parties are honouring and executing the disarmament measures they have undertaken to carry out. It follows from this that the control measures depend in a general way on the disarmament measures, and are applied to the disarmament measures. This, incidentally, is even more clearly put in that part of the sentence I quoted, which refers to "the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage".

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In his statement this morning the United States representative, if I am not mistaken, dwelt on the difficulty of deciding exactly how control should be applied to disarmament measures and of defining how far it should go. I agree with the United States representative that there are certain difficulties. But when we know exactly what the disarmament measures are, the difficulties will have to be overcome. In addition, it seems to me that if we know exactly what the disarmament measures are, we shall also know exactly the phases of disarmament to which control should be applied.

The necessity of control and the method of applying it have, moreover, been emphasized by several speakers and several statesmen who have spoken on general and complete disarmament and on disarmament in general, both during our discussions in the Eighteen Nation Committee and earlier. Everyone has admitted that control, as an integral part of disarmament, constitutes one of the essential elements of proposals for general and complete disarmament. It is therefore understood that each party to a treaty on disarmament is entitled to appropriate guarantees that the disarmament undertakings entered into by common consent will be strictly fulfilled. That has been confirmed by the explicit statements of many delegations and statesmen.

In his statement at the second meeting of our Conference, on 15 March 1962, Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, said:

"The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed upon will be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process of general and complete disarmament has begun. Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least of all States which have established close military alignments, are pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we expect others to take us at our word. The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament." (ENDC/PV.2, page 11)

Other representatives and political leaders have enlarged on this question of control both during our Conference and in the past. Mr. San Thiago Dantas, the Foreign Minister of Brazil, who not only stated his country's position, but also referred to the results of past discussions on this question which have made it

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

possible to sum up the work done in more or less precise terms: said, in his statement of 16 March /ENDC/PV.3, page 97, that he would like to recall the formula arrived after long discussions and accepted by everyone: no disarmament without control, no control without disarmament. This formula which, as I said, is the result of long and laborious discussion and examination of the question of disarmament, has been generally accepted in all the discussions that have taken place on disarmament: it has become, so to speak, an axiom.

In the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union, article 2 is devoted to general provisions concerning the control that would have to be exercised over disarmament measures.

"The States parties to the present treaty" - says the first paragraph of this article - "solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control, and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in Parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty" (ENDC/2, page 3). It is also stated that each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

These definitions used in the Soviet draft treaty are a subsequent elaboration of the principle enunciated in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961 on control over measures for general and complete disarmament. Hence not only do they remain within the limits, within the framework of that principle, but they embody its whole content. They are supremely necessary definitions, and are also sufficient for the exercise of strict international control over the disarmament measures undertaken while general and complete disarmament is being carried out.

For the execution of the control measures by which every disarmament measure would have to be accompanied during the implementation of the treaty, it is provided that there shall be established, within the framework of the United Nations, an international disarmament organization including all the States parties to the treaty, which in fact would have to include all States without exception. In this respect, too, the Soviet draft strictly conforms to the agreed principles set out in the Joint Statement. At the same time, it provides a subsequent and very useful elaboration of the formula employed in this Statement. The purpose of this elaboration is to define, in general terms, the structure of the international disarmament organization, its mode of operation, the information to which it should have access and the powers to be vested in it.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In the draft ENDC/18 submitted by the United States for the first part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament - which has been adequately defined - it is also provided page 2 that control measures will have to be taken to ensure that the agreed reductions are made. That draft also provides for the establishment of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure that all the disarmament measures are carried out and respected at all times.

Up to that point there is no difference, on the substance of the problem of control, between the positions of the two parties in the documents submitted.

Now whereas the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union is in conformity throughout with the principles for control set out in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961, which specifies that the nature and extent of such control must depend on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage, the United States draft is not in conformity with those principles. It departs from those principles and goes far beyond their real content.

In the second part of the sentence dealing with control, the United States draft in fact provides not only that all measures relating to disarmament shall be effectively verified, but also that control shall be established over the levels of armaments and armed forces. In taking up that position, the United States is seeking to introduce control and verification of the armaments retained, and when we consider the United States declaration on disarmament ENDC/6 entitled "A programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" - a declaration which, moreover, is reflected in the document just introduced - it becomes clear that such control and verification would apply to practically all armaments.

In the document now before us, a new concept of zonal inspection has been introduced. It will be seen at once that control is to be exercised over all armaments in the various zones, at least that is my first impression. That follows directly from the fact that during the first stage, for example, the United States programme and proposals do not provide for any disarmament measures at all, or only provide for measures which do nothing to reduce the military potential of the great Powers or of other States. This is all the more significant because that doctrine of control over armaments has been formulated on several occasions by various representatives of the United States during previous discussions on

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

general and complete disarmament. We should like to remind you that it was expounded at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly by Mr. Stevenson, the United States representative, who said on 15 November 1961:

"If it is the position of the Soviet Union that verification of agreed levels of armaments retained by States under a disarmament plan is espionage, then clearly there can be no general and complete disarmament agreement, for armaments destroyed are of less concern to us than armaments retained." Thus it is the remaining arms that interest the United States." ... No matter how many weapons were destroyed it would be the weapons... which were left that would be utilized in a military operation. This is a stumbling block which could be crucial to our deliberations." (A/C.1/PV.1195, pages 63-65)

Thus the representatives of the Western Powers are persisting in their wish to establish control not only over the implementation of disarmament measures, as laid down in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, but also over retained armaments. In other words, and according to the United States proposals, this demand would mean establishing control over the armaments existing at present, for reference to the declaration submitted by the United States as a disarmament programme, shows that no real disarmament measure - I stress this again - is provided for in Stage I or perhaps even in Stage II. At least, so far as Stage II is concerned we lack precise information.

I should like to point out that, unlike the Soviet Union draft, the United States programme - and now its Outline of a Treaty - for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, as it is called - provides only soothing, one might say imaginary, disarmament measures such as reducing the quantity of fissionable material for military purposes by fifty tons during the first stage. For to make this United States proposal to reduce fissionable material by fifty tons into a real disarmament measure, it would be necessary to make a considerable reduction in the weapons already manufactured and stocked by the United States at present, or at the time when the first stage of general and complete disarmament begins. The fact is that, even while proposing the reduction of fissionable material by fifty tons, the United States will not only keep all its stocks of nuclear weapons, but will also be able to manufacture new and improved ones. Thus not only will its nuclear striking power not be reduced, but it will be able to increase this considerably. That being so - and it seems unnecessary to labour the point - the desire to establish control over existing armaments might have a very unfavourable effect on the development of the international situation.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is necessary to point out that the object of all our efforts should be to formulate disarmament measures in such a way, and to apply them on such a scale and in such proportions, that they can facilitate the establishment and carrying out of effective control over the disarmament measures themselves. That is precisely how the Soviet proposal is conceived and drafted. The United States proposal, on the other hand, is worded in such a way that not only does it not meet the need for organizing control, but on the contrary it tends to transform control over disarmament measures into control over remaining weapons and hence into control over armaments pure and simple.

The effect of the proposal submitted to us this morning seems to be to split up disarmament measures in a way that would scarcely facilitate the establishment and execution of control and verification. This proposal is entirely consistent with what was already to be found in the disarmament programme presented by the United States.

It is true that in his statements during the general discussion Mr. Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, put forward proposals which, according to him, would facilitate control - proposals to which we shall have occasion to revert when we discuss this matter in greater detail. Moreover, those proposals have probably been elaborated in the draft submitted to us this morning. But it can be said at once that the whole United States programme, and the draft submitted to us now, far from facilitating the application of control measures to the corresponding disarmament measures, merely complicate the task and create situations in which control and inspection would in fact become pure and simple spying.

It is no mere coincidence that the representative of the Soviet Union, when explaining his country's position yesterday, gave an example which also illustrates the idea I have been explaining to you. That example was as follows:

"The force levels envisaged in Stage I would mean a reduction of approximately 15 per cent in the armed forces of the United States and the USSR. However, the demand for the verification of levels would entail an inspection and examination of all the remaining 85 per cent of their armed forces. A reduction of 15 per cent would not, of course, substantially weaken the military potential of States. But, on the other hand, it would enable an aggressive State.....to collect information...." (ENDC/PV.21, page 31)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In the presentation of the United States draft we heard this morning, we were told about the method of carrying out inspection by zones, developing and increasing it progressively parallel with the increase in the amount of disarmament being undertaken. But as the zones to be controlled and inspected were chosen, the work might be so arranged that certain persons could obtain not only a general idea, but even precise information about those zones - information which, with the help of other information, would provide an accurate picture of the country's defences, so that those who were harbouring certain intentions would be able to carry them out.

Furthermore, the unduly long periods for the stages - I should like to dwell on that too - and especially for stage I, proposed by the United States representative, are liable to cause additional difficulties. Indeed, the excessive duration of stage I itself and of the period for disarmament as a whole, by unduly prolonging the time-limits for carrying out various measures involving insignificant reductions in armaments, might make for an atmosphere of distrust between States and fresh international tensions, over and above those which already exist.

All these considerations confirm the Bulgarian delegation's fears concerning the definitions and the formulation of the provisions presented in the United States proposal for the first part of the Treaty, concerning the control and verification of general and complete disarmament.

Since we are considering the question of time-limits in direct connexion with inspection, it is worth recalling here the idea expressed at the meeting of 11 April by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, when he said:

"Now if there is a rapid process of disarmament leading to zero, obviously the period of uncertainty arising out of the controls not reaching a mathematical 100 per cent is diminished. That is a very valuable consideration, one which I think should lead just those countries which say they favour effective controls to propose a very quick plan." (ENDC/PV.18, page 38)

If, therefore, the Western Powers wish control to be carried out in full from the beginning or almost from the beginning of the disarmament process, they should also agree to the destruction of all armaments and the disbanding of all armed forces at the beginning.



(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Moreover, if they did that the Western countries would themselves be able to work out the control system to be applied to the process of disarmament; they need only accept the proposals made by the Soviet Union and the Soviet programme for carrying out general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union has proposed this more than once through the head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev; and Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, recalled the proposal at this Conference when he said on 15 March: "...the Soviet Union is ready to accept any proposals on control over disarmament put forward by the Western Powers if they will accept Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.2, page 11)

In conclusion, I should like to sum up the situation as it now stands with regard to the control measures to be provided for, which correspond to the disarmament measures. The Soviet Union proposals in part I, article 2 of the Soviet draft Treaty are in full conformity with the principles set forth in the Joint Statement of 20 September 1961, and, as we have stressed, embody their whole content. These proposals are also in conformity and in full accord with the facts and with the world situation as it stands today. They are not apt to cause fresh tensions or to arouse further suspicion that control over general and complete disarmament, in present circumstances, may turn into inspection of existing armaments and hence into legalized espionage.

Furthermore, we find in the United States draft a whole section concerning inspection which corresponds to the measures proposed by the Soviet Union. It would be realistic and perfectly consistent with the task the Conference has set itself, and with its method of work, to record the already existing agreement which, moreover, corresponds to the Joint Statement, and to adopt a joint text for article 2 of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

It is true that if we agree to proceed in this way at once there will still be some drafting work to be done, and this work is not always very easy; but that is why we have all agreed to have two co-Chairmen to help us in our work, as we help them in theirs, and it would be their task to set to work and submit an agreed text to us.

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to make two sets of remarks. The first set of remarks is directed to the pleasant surprise with which we were confronted today. In a sense it was a surprise; in a sense we had some expectation that

(Mr. Lall, India)

our United States colleagues would be producing a more elaborate paper on a treaty dealing with general and complete disarmament. I see it is called "general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world". Well, "in" peaceful world or "for" a peaceful world, in either case we are in favour of peace, I must say. We are very glad that this elaboration has been presented. As has been pointed out by our Bulgarian colleague, it will help the process of consideration of proposals dealing with general and complete disarmament.

May I add that I was personally glad to see that the first stage includes force limits and that in the second stage these limits have been set down as 1.05 million? I was not so glad to see that no time limit is specified for the third stage so far, but we presume that later some time limit will be set for the third stage. We are happy that this document is here; we will study it very carefully -- of course we have not yet had time to do so. We are grateful to Mr. Dean for introducing the document in the speech which he made earlier today.

Now I come to my second set of remarks. What are we going to do about general and complete disarmament? So far we have discussed a preamble, and we have also discussed another set of ideas which we have thought of as obligations, or as objectives and principles. I think we must now ask the co-Chairmen, who have before them two fairly elaborate draft treaties, to tell us what we should discuss next. My thought is that we should not start discussion of the total draft treaty which has been presented to us by the United States. This is not because we do not wish to discuss this treaty, but because we wish to discuss it in some sort of order. Are we going to discuss the parts of the pre-stage I of this draft and the corresponding parts in the Soviet draft dealing with control measures? We heard a statement on control measures by Mr. Zorin the other day; we heard another statement on this general subject by the Bulgarian representative today.

I should like to ask the co-Chairmen whether we are going to discuss in a general way control measures, or control obligations as they are called in the relevant part of the Soviet draft - that is to say in article 2. Then after that, in the Soviet draft, there is article 3, "Obligations to maintain international peace and security". There are also relevant clauses in the new United States draft dealing with the same matter. In any event we must first decide what we are going to discuss; otherwise I fear that our consideration of general and complete disarmament might become rather amorphous, and might flow in too many directions which will not be helpful to the orderly progress of our work.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I therefore address the following question to the co-Chairmen -- I do not ask for a reply at this moment; of course, if they can give a reply today, so much the better because we do not want to waste time: What are we going to discuss now? Are we going to discuss control obligations, or are the co-Chairmen going to bring us a document on general obligations relating to disarmament, on which, I presume, they are working? I should like some clarification of this issue.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If no one else wishes to speak, I should like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of Italy.

I too wish to thank the representative of the United States of America for the important contribution he has made to the work of the Conference today, by submitting the Outline of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. At first sight the text appears very specific, complete and constructive. I am sure that it will be most useful in helping us to make rapid progress in our work.

I think these proposals are very valuable because they are fully consistent with the objective we have set ourselves: to build a new world, a world without armaments, a peaceful world in which all peoples can enjoy security and peacefully pursue their efforts to achieve moral and material progress, under the aegis of international law. This objective seems to be very clearly stated in the United States proposal, which also shows us practical methods of attaining it.

Of course, this is only a preliminary appraisal. We intend to examine the United States document with the greatest care, and when we do so the interesting and comprehensive statement made today by Mr. Dean will be extremely helpful.

I am sure that Mr. Dean will allow us later to put a few questions to him and ask for clarification on various points. Personally, I hope we can have a thorough general discussion on this United States document as soon as possible. The first part of the statement by the Bulgarian representative, despite his somewhat hasty criticisms, seems to have opened such a discussion already. The Indian delegation has also commented. In any case, I think that the Conference, which now has two complete texts before it - the Soviet draft treaty, and the outline of a treaty submitted today by the United States delegation - has a solid basis for its future work, and that the discussion will become increasingly constructive. Since goodwill is not lacking on either side and we can rely on

(The Chairman, Italy)

the active co-operation of all delegations, I should like to confirm the confidence which I expressed yesterday after the drafting of the preamble was nearly completed. The Italian delegation considers that, in spite of the inevitable difficulties which, incidentally, were expected, the Conference is now really on the right road which should soon lead us to general and complete agreement.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): Today we have listened with attention to the speech of our United States colleague, and we have had a look at the document which he has tabled. It is, as Mr. Lall has observed, a document which we had been expecting for a long time: we had, in fact, been expecting an elaboration of the position of the United States delegation on the problem of general and complete disarmament -- an elaboration which would take account of the general position and of the method of procedure of our Conference. My delegation will, of course, carefully study the document we now have in our hands and will comment at the appropriate moment on its different parts.

At first sight it seems that the Soviet proposal is more systematic, more logical, more pertinent to the task before this Conference -- that is to say, the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. As far as the contents of the United States document are concerned, we feel, again at first sight, that it does not provide the quickest and most direct way to the accomplishment of our task. It is, we feel, a repetition -- with some additional points -- of the old and known positions which we have already had an opportunity to comment upon and in which we have indicated certain weaknesses.

Of course, as I have said, we will carefully study this very voluminous document and comment on the separate provisions and measures as the systematic procedure of the work of the Conference brings us to those provisions and measures at the different points of our discussion.

I do not share the doubts that my colleague Mr. Lall has expressed concerning the method of our work. I think that this Conference has adopted a certain method of work which we have followed up to now with good results. Yesterday we all congratulated our co-Chairman on the first good result of this work. My delegation is of the opinion that we have to follow this up, and at the corresponding stages to compare and to comment upon the two basic documents which we now have at our disposal.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would follow this method. I would like to express the opinion of my delegation on the point now under discussion: that is, the general obligations and the general character of control in a treaty on general and complete disarmament such as we are preparing here. Yesterday the representative of the Soviet Union opened this discussion in his remarks on article 2.

I think that all of us in this Conference agree that reliable and effective international control is a necessary component of general and complete disarmament. The realization of this general and complete disarmament presupposes that all participating States will be assured of a maximum degree of certainty that all partners will strictly honour all the obligations they have undertaken. Therefore it is necessary, it is logical, that the agreed control measures should ensure reliable and effective verification as to whether these disarmament obligations are being fulfilled. On the other hand, control obligations and measures have a direct impact on the vital interest of each of the participating States in safeguarding security. Therefore it is necessary to ensure that the realization of appropriate control measures should not go beyond the function of control over disarmament. Control must not be a pretext for collecting information of another character -- namely, information of an espionage character. I think that this has been recognized in our previous discussions by many speakers, and I will not dwell on this general principle any longer.

Taking this principle into consideration, we should consistently proceed from it. We should take into account that it is embodied in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, where it is stated that control must be adequate to disarmament and that -

"the nature and extent of such control should depend on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage." (ENDC/5, page 2)

This adequacy of control has several aspects. First and foremost is the extent of control measures, and one might say that this is the quantitative aspect. The extent of control measures must correspond to the extent of the disarmament measures to be undertaken and must not go beyond them. It cannot be permitted that activities not directly linked with verification of the implementation of the agreed disarmament measures be carried out under the pretext of control.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

Adequate control also presupposes that the respective control measures are in keeping with the verified disarmament measures as to their nature also. One might call this the qualitative aspect of the adequacy of control. Control must be carried out by the application of such methods and means as, on the one hand, will ensure a truly reliable verification of the respective disarmament measures but, on the other hand, will not make it possible to acquire other kinds of information which have nothing in common with disarmament, and specifically with the corresponding step or measure of disarmament.

Finally, the adequacy of control presupposes that control depends on disarmament measures also as far as the timing of the measures is concerned. There must be assurance that the implementation of the respective disarmament measures will be verified from beginning to end. At the same time, it must not be admitted that any measures should be introduced under the name of control earlier than the respective disarmament measures begin to be implemented.

Having in mind these basic lines, the draft treaty submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union consistently proceeds from the principle of the adequacy of control. The basic principles that should guide reliable control over general and complete disarmament are formulated in article 2 of the draft. This article elaborates paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement. It adheres to that paragraph strictly and renders its basic provisions concrete and precise. Therefore we regard this draft as the most appropriate basis for the Committee's consideration of this question.

The basic concept of the Soviet draft provides that in the process of general and complete disarmament, along with the growing extent of disarmament measures the extent of control should also expand, so that when general and complete disarmament has been completed control will also be general and complete.

We welcome the fact that in some of their recent statements the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers have recognized the principle of adequacy: that control must be adequate to the extent of the disarmament measures being carried out. It is a positive sign that the Western Powers agreed to formulate this principle in the Joint Statement and that in some statements made in this Conference the delegation of the United States has also expressed agreement with this principle. Of course we should like to see this principle applied in dealing with the practical consideration of how to ensure reliable control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament. In this sense, the

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

wording of paragraph 3, part B, of the first United States draft presented to the Conference, with regard to the general obligations of general and complete disarmament, gives rise to certain doubts on our part.

We think it would be of no benefit for our talks if we were pressed to accept, instead of reliable control over disarmament, the demand for what, in literature on the subject and in statements by officials of the United States and other Western Powers, is called "arms control". This would of course place obstacles in the way of our deliberations.

This concept of arms control, of course, is not consistent with the idea of general and complete disarmament under reliable international control, and in its substance it even opposes this idea. It has been a tradition for the authors and promoters of this idea of arms control to place it in contrast with general and complete disarmament. My delegation would like to point to several works which have been written precisely to develop the idea of arms control in the West. I should like to quote from the book "Strategy and Arms Control", by T.C. Shelling and M.H. Halperin, who are, if I am not mistaken, recognized authorities on this question in the United States

"What is striking is not how novel the methods and purposes of arms control are, and how different from the methods and purposes of national military policy; what is striking is how much overlap there is. There is hardly an objective of arms control to be described in this study that is not equally a continuing urgent objective of national military strategy -- of our unilateral military plans and policies."

I think that this shows that the substance of the concept of arms control is different from general and complete disarmament.

We are convinced that the question of control of the implementation of general and complete disarmament cannot be approached in such a way that it should be an instrument for enforcing unilateral military plans of individual countries. Therefore arms control cannot replace control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

The demand for arms control is in evident contradiction of the principle contained in the Joint Statement that in the process of general and complete disarmament the security and justified interests of all participating States should be safeguarded in equal measure. In its substance it provides for safeguarding the security and justified interests of only some countries.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

Those who advocate so-called arms control declare at the same time that no State would be at a disadvantage since equal possibilities of control would be secured for all States. But the reality is different. Information which could be acquired by the introduction of so-called arms control is not of equal importance for all States. It is practically insignificant for countries which make efforts to safeguard their own security exclusively. For such safeguarding it is sufficient to have reliable verification that all States are honouring their obligations in respect of the reduction and elimination of agreed armed forces and armaments of a certain kind.

On the other hand, such information would be of considerable significance to a potential aggressor. The main essence of these demands is not to acquire data on the level of armed forces and armaments, for such data would be freely available in the process of general and complete disarmament. What is in the background of these demands is that they would make it possible to acquire exact information on the dislocation of certain armed forces, armaments and installations. The importance of such information from the point of view of the preparation of an effective surprise attack has been underlined here on a number of previous occasions, and there is no need for me to deal with it again.

Both the Soviet draft in article 2 and the United States draft contained in document ENDC/18 envisage the establishment of an international disarmament organization which would be charged with the exercise of control over the implementation of obligations ensuing from general and complete disarmament. The Soviet draft has the good feature, which makes it preferable to us, of outlining certain concrete principles in accordance with which such an organization would be established, especially with respect to the composition of its principal organs. The main principles have been formulated in article 2 and have been further elaborated in detail in part V of the Soviet draft treaty. We have noted from a first reading of the United States treaty outline submitted today that it also contains provisions for the setting up of an international disarmament organization. Of course we think that it is good to include some general provisions outlining the character of such an organization in the introductory articles of the treaty. That is provided for in article 2 of the Soviet draft treaty.

The Soviet draft envisages that the control commission, which would be a permanent body, would consist of representatives of the three groups of States; that is, that its organs would reflect the existing three groups of States: the



(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

socialist countries, the countries members of the Western military and political alliances, and the neutral countries. The principle of the participation of the three existing groups of States in the solution of principal international issues has been put on our agenda by life itself. It is a recognition of the objective reality that there are three groups of States existing in the world today.

Life has also confirmed the correctness of the consistent application of this principle. The best evidence of this is the work of our Conference, which has started the concrete consideration of general and complete disarmament and has accomplished certain results. This is of course due to a number of factors, but, in our view, it is indisputable that the participation of representatives of eight non-aligned countries in our deliberations has played an important part. We believe that, as in the disarmament talks, these three main groups of countries should also be represented in the safeguarding of reliable and effective control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

We believe that the adoption of the concept of general and complete disarmament and the agreed principles formulated in the Joint Statement create prerequisites for overcoming the obstacle which the question of reliable and adequate control seems to have posed in disarmament talks in the past. The Joint Statement is beyond doubt a step forward in the solution of these problems. The principles which it contains are consistently applied in the Soviet draft, and particularly in article 2, which we are considering today. Therefore, we see no reason why a great majority of the provisions contained in article 2 of the Soviet draft should cause any problems or difficulties.

We think that we should adopt the same procedure in this question as we adopted, with some results, in the consideration of the preceding provisions. This procedure has, in fact, moved us forward. It would also certainly be helpful in finding mutually acceptable wording on a number of basic issues with respect to the general outline of provisions for ensuring effective and reliable international control over general and complete disarmament.

It may be expected that, as in the case of the preamble, we will perhaps not reach agreement on all aspects here. Those outstanding problems could be solved at a further stage of our talks when we are faced with the concrete application of control measures corresponding to the concrete disarmament measures in the different stages of the process of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

We are convinced that the adoption of the basic obligations in the question of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament as formulated in article 2 of the Soviet draft would play a positive role in concrete deliberations at a later stage. Their observance would at a later stage make it easier to elaborate concrete control measures which should be carried out in connexion with individual disarmament measures.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with interest to the statements this morning. I would first of all like to say a few words about the most important statement which we heard from the representative of the United States and about the new and impressive document which he submitted. If I may say so, I thought it was a most valuable and striking statement which he made to the Conference this morning, and I am sure we shall all want to study it with care. In so far as we have had time to look at this massive document in the brief period since it has been submitted, it certainly appears to my delegation to be a most valuable amplification of the United States proposals of September 1961. In that sense I am very pleased indeed that we have it before us. I am sure that it will contribute very much towards facilitating the further progress of our work.

I do not propose to comment on this document in detail this morning, because it obviously deserves the most close and careful study. But I shall hope in due course to have the opportunity of speaking constructively on the many new points which it clearly raises for us. Of course I shall want to have the opportunity of comparing the relevant articles with the Soviet proposals which have been in our hands for several weeks. We shall want to try and marry the relevant proposals here; and I would assume that this was what was in the mind of the representative of India this morning when he asked, where do we go from here?

In relation to that it seems to me that we have started on a discussion which our Soviet colleague introduced on Monday /ENDC/PV.21, page 26/ in regard to article 2 of the Soviet draft and also the relevant part of the United States document which had previously been circulated as document ENDC/18. That, I noticed, is largely incorporated in the new proposal which the United States has put forward, but it is still in the initial part of the treaty. Therefore I assume we would wish to complete our deliberations on these introductory and initial articles. Thereafter, I would think the questions of the representative

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of India would be very relevant indeed. I think that we shall probably have once more to ask our co-Chairmen to get together in relation to this and decide what is the most effective way of proceeding once we have disposed of the introductory articles, once in fact we are ready to get down to discussion of stage I. I think that is inevitably how we shall have to proceed.

I therefore do not propose to comment in detail on this new draft this morning, although I shall wish to comment briefly on one aspect of what the representative of the United States had to say in introducing the document to us, because to some extent it overlaps the debate in regard to verification and control. In that sense I should certainly like to have the opportunity of commenting on what our United States colleague said.

Before continuing, I would refer very briefly to the intervention of our colleague from Bulgaria. If he will forgive me for saying so, I thought he was just a little too quick in criticizing the provisions of this new document. I think that he, like the rest of us, will want to study it, and I hope that at a later stage he will find it more to his taste.

He went on to discuss the control provisions in the document, and made some fairly critical remarks, at the end of which he urged us all to be in harmony. I am all for harmony, but it must not come from one side -- I leave it at that.

Our colleague from Czechoslovakia, at one stage in the interesting speech to which we have just listened, argued -- very genuinely, I am sure -- that control could provide a country with information which could help it to launch a surprise attack. He seemed to be arguing that if control were allowed to go beyond what had been actually discarded it could encourage a country to launch a surprise attack. I listened to this with interest because it seemed to me to have some relevance to some comments which I think I made yesterday, and which other representatives have made, on the value of discussing surprise attack as a separate item in the Committee of the Whole. I believe that our Soviet colleague does not fully realize the value of discussing that item at this moment, and if our Czechoslovak colleague would have a word with Mr. Zorin after this meeting it might possibly facilitate our discussion of this valuable matter at a later date.

I come now to the question of control, and to the very important speech made by the representative of the Soviet Union the other day [ibid.] I have studied that speech with great care and have again compared the relevant

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article of the Soviet treaty with the proposals in the United States memorandum put before us earlier. Of course, every measure of disarmament that we tackle will call for a different degree of verification. We should not lose sight of the fact that the verification process itself, whatever we decide upon, will be extremely expensive and extremely complex. For this reason I am quite certain that neither side will call for more than what it considers to be the minimum necessary for any given measure or stage. When we come to work out these specific measures we can at the same time work out precisely what degree of verification will be necessary for each. In doing so we can be guided, I think, by article 6 of the Agreed Principles, that the nature and extent of control should depend on the requirements for verification of the individual measures being carried out at each stage.

What, above all, it seems to me we have to aim at is that these measures should involve a continuous process of the destruction of weapons and should be accompanied by a continuous and adequate process of verification. I should have thought that that was basic to the consideration of us all in regard to this matter. Therefore, when I look at the text, I could agree with a number of the intentions expressed in the Soviet article 2, though not necessarily with all the wording. I would pick out here only one point on which to comment in criticism. I refer to the last words in article 2, paragraph 4, which speak of ensuring adequate representation on the organization of "all three existing groups of States". Frankly, I am not very happy with that phrase, because I doubt very much whether many of our colleagues outside the Eastern and Western groupings like to regard themselves as a group. I should have thought that this could be very much more happily worded for achieving the same object which I think our Soviet colleague has in mind. I throw that out merely as a drafting point. But of course one has to study also the United States proposals' wording, with which I find myself largely in agreement. It would seem that when we have had our debate on this we can once more ask our co-Chairmen to try and draw together the ideas in relation to this particular wording.

The discussion we have so far had does undoubtedly, I think, show some of the difficulties with which we shall be confronted. Mr. Zorin himself, when he spoke on Monday I think, said that he did not want to go into detail on the subject of the international disarmament organization since this was covered at a later stage in the Soviet draft. I agree with that: I think that is right.

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I am quite ready to discuss it in detail whenever the Committee thinks it appropriate. Vital as will be this organization in the disarmament process, that discussion could, I personally think, be deferred until we have got some way into the discussion of the substantive issues. Indeed, I should have thought that this agreed very largely with the thinking of the Soviet delegation in this regard. I understand it has said on various occasions that it wishes to discuss control and verification not in isolation but in relation to particular projects.

I would therefore like to confine myself now to just one or two points of principle. One which has already emerged very strongly is the question of what is sometimes referred to as remainders, but what I refer to as retained war potential, what is left at any stage after any reduction has taken place. Mr. Zorin gave us to understand at several points in his speech on Monday that the Soviet Government would in no circumstances agree to any verification of the numbers of troops and quantities of armaments remaining after agreed reductions had taken place. That has really been repeated again this morning in the speeches to which we have listened from the representative of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Again we have been told that verification of this nature is or could be espionage.

Perhaps in this context I might recall to the Committee something that my leader, Lord Home, said when he was here at the start of our discussions. On 20 March he said:

"There may at one time have been a great military advantage in secrecy  
... but as there is now no military advantage in war, where do the  
profits of secrecy lie?" (ENDC/PV.5, page 11)

I think that was a very profound phrase, and I recall it to my colleagues because it seems to me that this is an argument which certainly goes with some of the arguments we heard the other day to the effect that war cannot be used as an element of policy. Lord Home's argument is exactly in line with that: if in fact there are now no military advantages in war, what is the value of secrecy?

But undoubtedly we have to face the fact that this anxiety does still exist. It was brought out very clearly in various comments made by Mr. Zorin on Monday. But at the same time he made it quite clear early in his speech that the Soviet Union did not expect others to take their word any more than the Soviet Union would take the word of others. He said:

"We are not prepared to take anyone at their word, particularly States which have organized closed military alignments pursuing a policy of proliferating armaments and establishing their military bases along the frontiers of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.21, page 27)

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I think we know whom Mr. Zorin was thinking of there. Then he said:

"We ourselves do not ask that we should be taken at our word." (ibid.)

That, I think, is straightforward talking, and as such I admire it. I think it is right that we start from that conception; we know precisely that we all think alike in regard to this. But, that being so, we have got to have ways and means of giving one another that assurance that we need.

Mr. Zorin said, a little later in his speech -- and I agree with this:

"...The volume of control should be in strict conformity with the volume and nature of the disarmament measures..." (ENDC/PV.21, page 30)

I think our United States colleague used almost identical words this morning when he was referring to this point. There is thus general agreement, at any rate, on the fact that there must be a genuine correspondence between the actual element of disarmament and the element of control.

Our difficulty -- and it is a difficulty which we have got to face -- is to find an agreed way of carrying that into effect, taking into account on the one hand the fears of espionage that are expressed, and on the other hand the feeling of a genuine need to know that measures which have been undertaken are in fact really being carried out. Mr. Zorin, I thought, tried to deal with this in his speech on Monday when he said:

"If, in the course of disarmament, both sides reduce their armed forces to an agreed extent at each stage, the threat of a military conflict will undoubtedly be lessened..." (ENDC/PV.21, page 30)

A little later on he said this in regard to the equilibrium of terror between East and West:

"If this expression were translated into normal human language this would signify, from the military point of view, that between the two main military groups there is an equilibrium of forces. If this is so, and if during the process of disarmament each side were to reduce its military power to an agreed strength as regards armaments and troops, it is obvious that the ratio of forces would not be impaired." (ibid.)

That last phrase is prefaced by the word "If", and Mr. Zorin went on to say "each side would reduce its military power to an agreed strength". This is the key to the problem, really: how one ascertains whether a Power has reduced to an agreed strength.

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It seems to me that there are two separate issues to face. If one reduces by an agreed number, that is one matter. But if one reduces to an agreed strength or to an agreed level, that is quite another matter. Because if one is going to reduce to an agreed level, then one must have some way of verifying that the reduction actually has been made to that level. Of course, there is always the fact to be remembered that when one is reducing to an agreed level there must be a check that that level has not been exceeded by new production going on at the same time. But if one is reducing to an agreed level, one must find a way of getting some sort of check which will not bring into play the fears and anxieties which were expressed by our Soviet colleagues and yet at the same time will give a measure of security to others of us who feel that we must have assurances that an agreed level is in fact an agreed level and that it has not been exceeded.

Reductions by an agreed number -- and one suggestion in this respect was, I think, put to us by our colleague from the United States this morning -- that clearly could be verified without difficulty. But when it is reduction to an agreed level, we have got to find a way -- and it is our duty around this table to find a way -- which will satisfy both sides.

In that context, then, I listened with very great care to what our United States colleague said this morning on this question of what is sometimes called "sampling techniques". In the plan that has just been tabled, there is a suggestion for zonal or sampling inspection -- it is made quite clear that this is not put forward as a positive, definite proposal, as being the only way in which the problem could be solved. Our United States colleague went on to explain to us the provisions which the United States had in mind in that regard.

I think we have to look at this very carefully indeed. It does seem to me, and it has seemed to me from the moment I first heard this suggestion -- I think it was first put forward at one of the Pugwash Conferences -- that this does provide the elements of a solution between East and West on this problem. I hope that we can consider it carefully and dispassionately.

As I understood my United States colleague this morning, he was saying that countries will be divided into zones, and as one proceeded with disarmament, so one would proceed with the zones. I understood him to mean -- I am not sure whether he precisely said this and I do not want to put words into his mouth -- that if one agreed to 10 per cent disarmament, then one had the right to inspection of 10 per cent of the territory of the other country. In other words,

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10 per cent of the zones -- however many there would be -- would be available for inspection, and they would be chosen by the country on the other side. As one advanced to 20 per cent of elimination of armaments, so one would advance to 20 per cent of zones.

It seems to me that if it is married mathematically in that way it does accept the basic principle to which our Soviet colleague attaches so much importance -- the basic principle that the percentage of inspection must not exceed the percentage of disarmament. If that be so, I do think there is merit in this proposal. However, if it does not satisfy our Soviet colleague -- and I hope very much it does -- then I would say very sincerely to him that he has an obligation to make some other suggestion which will help to overcome this difficulty. In other words, it seems to me that an imaginative proposal has been put forward here; I hope it will be accepted; but if it is not accepted it is not sufficient merely to rest on these declarations that anything which seeks verification of agreed remaining war potential is espionage, because to rest on that is in fact to put the other representatives at this Conference in an impossible position. We have got to find a way out of this difference. I think this suggestion is a worthwhile one, but if it is not accepted we must have some other proposal from our Eastern colleagues which really faces up to this problem.

I was encouraged when Mr. Zorin said that his delegation was fully prepared to study carefully any other proposals or measures which might be advanced by other States. I say to him that I very much hope he will study this suggestion, because it seems to me that it does offer very definite advantages. In the same way, he recognized the need for international control over --

"...enterprises which previously were wholly or partly engaged in manufacturing the means of delivering nuclear weapons with a view to preventing any clandestine resumption of their manufacture." (ENDC/PV.21, page 32)

Presumably, if he accepts that principle for nuclear weapon vehicles, he will also accept it for other weapons.

It therefore seems that there is a considerable measure of agreement here if only we can get to the bottom of this basic difficulty, which I have tried to define as seems to me to be required. And I say again -- I have made this suggestion before in various contexts and it has not been taken up -- that possibly this is a question which could be studied by a sub-committee. I do



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not press that if it is not acceptable, but it seems to me that this is a matter which requires the most careful consideration if our problem is to be solved. Let us consider this further at some stage, but it need not hold up our work of completing our discussion in regard to the relevant article of the treaty which we are considering, because it is a preliminary article. If necessary, we could of course deal with it as we dealt with the preamble, including the maximum of agreement on both sides and putting between brackets such points as are not agreed. I think this would help us in our work. I am very conscious of the fact that we want to get on to the discussion of substantive measures of actual disarmament, and in that discussion some of the problems of verification and control may not seem so difficult as when we discuss them in the abstract.

I would therefore suggest that when this debate has been concluded we ask our co-Chairmen to try to get the greatest measure they can of common agreement on the wording of such an article, to set aside the points on which they are not able to agree and to permit us to proceed as soon as we can thereafter to the discussion in some form or other of substantive measures in this field. In saying that I am not forgetting, of course, that there is also in the initial part of the Soviet draft treaty another important article dealing with the obligation to maintain international peace and security. These are matters to which I attach very great importance, and presumably we would wish to have a discussion on them too. What I am seeking to do is get ahead so that we can come to the substantive matters which I am sure we all wish to discuss.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): I would like to clarify one point concerning the conclusions drawn by the representative of the United Kingdom from our arguments on the adequacy of control. We are of course grateful that he paid so much attention to our arguments in favour of the adequacy of control not exceeding the corresponding disarmament measures, but we feel that the conclusions he drew concerning the procedure in the Committee of the Whole were not quite accurate. Our arguments lead us logically to insist on adequacy of control when discussing the problem of general and complete disarmament, but they do not lead us to another conclusion which we feel to be inconsistent but which Mr. Godber put forward -- that is, that we are in favour of starting up again the discussion on surprise attack, which in the past proved to be a very lengthy and, unfortunately, rather fruitless discussion. He concluded that we should be in favour of holding

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this discussion once again in the Committee of the Whole, whose task it is to deal with measures which would help to lessen international tension and to create a more favourable climate for solving the problem of general and complete disarmament.

With great respect, however, I must assure the representative of the United Kingdom that we will not follow his kind suggestion and, like our Soviet and Polish colleagues, will not agree to give priority to the doubtful discussion of the item on surprise attack over the discussion of the problems of non-nuclear zones and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, of the urgency of which our delegation is fully conscious and on which we are insisting in full agreement with our Soviet and Polish colleagues.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I only want to say how sad it makes me to observe how ineffective my arguments are.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its twenty-third meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. F. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Bulgaria, India, Italy, Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom.

"The delegation of the United States submitted to the Conference an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 19 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.